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The time is right for Ireland to reform its laws on abortion.
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In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Ireland’s implementation of
abortion laws had violated the rights of a woman who was forced to travel abroad to
terminate her pregnancy. Liz Wicks outlines the legal position, noting that although Ireland
has some of the most restrictive abortion legislation in Europe, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Irish Constitution as permitting abortion in cases where the mother ’s life is at
risk. It remains to be seen whether the Irish government’s response to the ruling will lead to
a wider reform process in which the country’s abortion laws can be brought into step with
other European states.  
These are changing times f or Ireland’s controversial abortion laws. The recent government
announcement that it will introduce legislation to clarif y the circumstances in which abortion is permitted
in Ireland is a signif icant development in an on-going saga on which moral and religious opinions dif f er
greatly.
Ireland has very restrictive laws on abortion, which place it outside of  an emerging European consensus
in which over f orty European states permit abortion where there is a risk to the woman’s health. Abortion
on demand (without the need f or a justif ying reason) is legally permitted during the f irst trimester of
pregnancy in over thirty European states. By contrast, the Irish Constitution’s strong protection f or the
right to lif e of  the f oetus severely restricts the circumstances in which abortion could be constitutionally
permitted in that state.
The constitutional posit ion is not,
however, quite as stark as might be
assumed. First, while the Irish
Constitution does indeed protect the
right to lif e of  the f oetus, it also
protects the potentially conf licting right
to lif e of  the mother. Secondly, the
1992 Supreme Court case of  AG v X
and others acknowledged that this
provision means that an abortion can
be lawf ully available if  there is a real
and substantial risk to the woman’s lif e
and, f urthermore, extended that
priorit isation of  the mother ’s lif e to
situations in which there is a risk of
suicide. Thirdly, two constitutional
amendments have clarif ied that
Ireland’s strong constitutional protection f or unborn lif e shall not prevent f reedom to travel to another
state in order to obtain an abortion, nor prevent the provision of  inf ormation about abortion services
lawf ully provided in other states. There have, theref ore, already been some inroads into the
constitutional protection f or unborn lif e.
It was a decision by the European Court of  Human Rights in 2010 which inspired the latest development.
A, B, C v Ireland concerned three applicants who had all travelled to the UK in order to obtain abortions.
The f irst two applicants did so because their reasons f or seeking a termination of  pregnancy would
undoubtedly be illegal in Ireland (i.e. f or reasons of  health and well-being). The European Court of  Human
Rights granted wide discretion to Ireland to determine the extent to which it would protect the right to lif e
of  the unborn due to the lack of  a consensus on this specif ic question. It did, however, recognise ‘a
consensus amongst a substantial majority of  the contracting states of  the Council of  Europe towards
allowing abortion on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law’. Perhaps surprisingly this emerging
consensus did not entice the Court to reduce the degree of  discretion (or, in the Court’s terminology,
‘width of  the margin of  appreciation’) given to Ireland. The illegality of  all abortions f or health or well-
being reasons in Ireland did not amount to an inf ringement of  the f irst two applicant’s right to respect f or
private lif e in Article 8 ECHR.
It is, however, the issues raised by the third applicant in the A, B, C case that have proven to be of
greatest signif icance. This is because she sought an abortion on the basis of  a risk to her lif e. This
should, in theory, have been lawf ul under the Irish Constitution. She claimed, however, that she was
unable to establish her right to an abortion in Ireland due to the lack of  an ef f ective procedure f or doing
so. The Strasbourg Court agreed with her that, despite such an abortion being in theory permissible
under the Irish Constitution, the lack of  legislative implementation of  the risk to lif e exception ‘has
resulted in a striking discordance between the theoretical right to a lawf ul abortion in Ireland on the
grounds of  a relevant risk to a woman’s lif e and the reality of  its practical implementation.’ The crux of
the problem f or Ireland was that there had been no specif ic legislative implementation of  the exception
implied in Art 40.3.3 of  the Constitution, and no legislative recognition of  that exception to the general
criminal prohibit ion of  abortion. This meant that in practice, a woman seeking a lif e-saving abortion could
only choose f rom the two extremes of  a medical consultation or a constitutional review. The Strasbourg
Court was adamant that neither of  these options was an appropriate procedure f or clarif ying the legal
posit ion f or a pregnant woman.
It was, theref ore, the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of  legality f or abortions that led to the
f inding that Ireland was in violation of  Article 8 ECHR, which guarantees a right to respect f or private lif e.
The clear message coming f rom the Strasbourg Court in this and other cases is that a state has
considerable discretion to choose the circumstances of  legality f or terminations of  pregnancy, but it
must ensure that any legal right given to a pregnant woman is an enf orceable and ef f ective one.
The judgement met with much heated debate within Ireland, which was only intensif ied with the tragic
news that, while the government was deciding how to implement the judgement, a woman had died af ter
having been denied an abortion. Savita Halappanavar died in Galway University Hospital during a
miscarriage. Her husband says she repeatedly asked f or her 19 week-old pregnancy to be terminated,
but this was ref used because there was a f oetal heartbeat. The swell of  public support f or clarif ication
of  the law has provided a poignant backdrop to the Irish government’s recent announcement of  new
legislation and regulations.
The government’s plans f ollowed recommendations f rom an expert group on how to implement the A, B,
C judgment. Although the details are not yet apparent, the Irish government has clarif ied that it will
legislate to permit abortion only in circumstances where it is a last resort and there is a real and
substantial risk to a woman’s lif e. The announcement met with horror in some quarters (such as some
Catholic bishops) and relief  in others. The perception of  the signif icance of  the change to be made is
particularly interesting. Headlines declaring ‘Ireland to legalise abortions where woman’s lif e is at risk’
seem to overlook the f act, crucial to the A, B, C judgment, that the Irish Constitution, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, has already conceded the legality of  abortions to save the pregnant woman’s lif e.
The f act that this is widely unknown only proves that the Strasbourg Court was correct to regard this as
a theoretical legality that was not ref lective of  actual practice. The legislative steps which will now be
proposed will strive to turn theory into reality, to the benef it of  women such as Mrs Halappanavar.
Whether it will prove to be the f irst step in more widespread legal ref orm to bring Ireland more into line
with the consensus throughout most of  Europe remains to be seen.
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